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Abstract: Based on two case studies conducted at local sites in Northern Thailand 
and Lao PDR, the objectives of this paper are (i) to assess whether conditions for 
the establishment of PES at the watershed level exist in the uplands of mainland 
SE Asia and (ii) to examine and discuss limitations that are likely to impinge 
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on direct transfer of the PES concept as well as the institutional adaptations 
and support that are required for the successful implementation of PES markets 
in this regional context. The study’s main findings are that: (i) acceptance of 
PES principles and constraints are directly related to stakeholders’ perception 
of their land rights irrespective of their actual rights; (ii) willingness to pay 
(WTP) is very low among local stakeholders, making any PES market unlikely 
to emerge without external support; (iii) the classical scheme for watershed 
services hardly applies in its original form because environmental service (ES) 
providers and buyers are generally the same people; (iv) where potential ES 
buyers feel that ES providers are better-off or wealthier than them, they do 
not have any WTP for ES; (v) good governance, including a strong liaising at 
various levels between people and the authorities is a strong prerequisite for 
the successful establishment of PES markets, even without direct government 
funding.
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1. Introduction
Van Lynden and Oldeman (1997) categorise virtually all land within Southeast 
Asia as moderately to severely degraded. Erosion by water represents the most 
common mode of land degradation, with agriculture and deforestation as the 
two major causal factors. Northern Thailand is highly susceptible to soil erosion 
due to its undulating topography, steep slopes and high rainfall, but natural 
degradation and decline in soil fertility has been accelerated over the past few 
decades by the encroachment of agricultural activities on forests and poor 
land management practices (Lu et al. 2008). In Thailand the heightened risk 
of landslides and flash floods from acute erosion was instrumental in the Royal 
Forest Department’s (RFD) decision to cancel timber concessions in natural 
forests, particularly in upland areas (Lakanavichian 2001). Land degradation 
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is also a major concern in northern Lao PDR, where the combined effects of 
climate, topography and soils make much of the sloping uplands susceptible 
to erosion (ICEM 2003). Moreover, the soaring expansion of maize cultivation 
throughout Lao PDR and northern Thailand since the early 2000s has caused so 
much erosion that, in some places, the entire topsoil has already disappeared, 
which led Lienhard et al. (2006) to label this land use change an example 
of ‘resource mining’ agriculture. In this context, there clearly is a pressing 
need for the adoption of improved land-use and agricultural techniques in the 
region. 
Environmental governance in developing countries has not yet effectively 
addressed such urgent needs. It has characteristically been oscillating between 
command and control limitations imposed upon local people and integrated 
conservation and development projects (ICDPs) (Wunder 2006). Proponents 
of ICDPs postulate that poverty alleviation programmes will catalyse trickle 
down improvements in sustainable land-use, based on the theory that raising 
incomes is a critical precursor to adoption of sustainable production techniques 
and movement away from poverty related deforestation (Gillis and Vincent 
2000; Wunder 2006). Thus far, however, none of these strategies have proven 
successful in SE Asia. For example Chape (2001) argues that the effectiveness 
of ICDP projects in the Lao PDR is unclear because of their inability to address 
“urgent, priority (environmental) issues.” Recent studies conducted in five SE 
Asia countries also showed that the rate of adoption of conservation technologies 
is not always directly related to farmers’ income (Clement et al. 2007; Clement 
and Amezaga 2008; Valentin et al. 2008). In addition, it often proves difficult to 
arrange timely governmental intervention in environmental issues in a context 
of rapid change such as the one that has prevailed in SE Asia over the past 
two decades (MIDAS 1998). When available, governmental policy is often 
unrealistic at the local scale and may even lead to conflicts among villagers 
(Phengsopha and Morimoto 2003). Thus, one of the greatest challenges for 
watershed management remains to design and establish integrative frameworks 
for coordination and harmonization of government and local community actions 
(Thomas 2008).
In this context PES markets represent an alternative to conventional 
regulations and market-based tools and are popular where physical and financial 
demand for environmental services cannot be financed by traditional fiscal 
tools (Scherr et al. 2006). The already insufficient level of government finance, 
Overseas Development Assistance and private philanthropy allocated to natural 
resource management is also consistently declining (FAO 2007). In these cases, 
proponents see PES markets as an institutional solution to formally counter the so 
called “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968), defined as “a dilemma in which 
multiple individuals acting independently in their own self-interest can ultimately 
destroy a shared resource even where it is clear that it is not in anyone’s long-
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term interest for this to happen”. There is also a trend toward growing corporate 
interest in environmental investments, partly due to the realization that payments 
for ES can deliver a return on investment, such as increased life expectancy of 
expensive hydropower generators (Mulder et al. 2005). In Lao PDR, for example, 
under the former Mekong Wetlands Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable 
Use Programme (MWPB), launched in 2006 for the Nam Theun 2 project, the 
hydropower company committed itself to pay for protection of upstream forests 
in order to prevent reservoir siltation over a period of 30 years. In practice PES 
markets are at various stages of development worldwide and few programmes 
have actually proceeded beyond the planning stage.
Mountainous areas of mainland SE Asia form a physically, culturally and 
linguistically diverse region that stretches across the northern part of Myanmar, 
Lao PDR, Thailand, Vietnam and into Yunnan, China. Common across the 
region is a high dependence on agriculture for subsistence and income. Likewise 
many people’s livelihoods are vulnerable to any loss in productivity associated 
with resource degradation (Yasuyuki and Rambo 2004). Finding ways that can 
guarantee the maintenance of ES through sustainable resource management is 
therefore a major regional challenge for the uplands of SE Asia.
The objective of this paper is to discuss, based on two case studies conducted 
at sites in northern Thailand and Lao PDR, whether or not such upland areas 
of mainland SE Asia offer conditions suitable for establishment of payments for 
watershed services, i.e. locally-based programmes (villages, land-user groups) 
designed to control soil erosion, sediment transport and water quality. The paper 
will also (i) discuss limitations that are likely to impinge on direct transfer of 
the PES concept; (ii) examine institutional adaptations and support that will 
be required for successful implementation of PES markets and; (iii) highlight 
those areas where PES appear especially promising, where they are likely to be 
ineffective, and where they could complement other policy instruments.
2. Background and methods
2.1. Basic principles of PES
The literature identifies five general criteria central to a successful and self 
supporting PES market (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002; Wunder 2005; van 
Noordwijk et al. 2007; Pagiola 2008); (i) transactions must be voluntary; (ii) the ES 
(or the lands used to provide the service) must be well defined; (iii) the ES must be 
bought by at least one buyer; (iv) the ES must be sold by at least one supplier; and 
(v) payment is conditional upon receiving the ES. Several additional conditions 
are also critical for PES implementation. Sufficient awareness of stakeholders 
at every level is critical to ensuring that PES operates as a true market rather 
than a non-conditional form of taxation or subsidy (Tomich et al. 2004). The 
institutional context of PES is also unanimously recognised by authors as critical 
to the success of PES. Intermediary institutions must play a fundamental role 
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in supporting all aspects of operation of PES markets, particularly in countries 
with relatively weak governance structures (FAO and REDLACH 2004; Mayrand 
and Paquin 2004; Wunder 2005; Huang and Upadhyaya 2007; Pagiola 2007). 
Lastly, successful PES projects tend to appear in regions with an existing level of 
stakeholder organisation (Gutman 2003; Rosales 2003) and clear property rights 
are usually considered as central to PES markets (Wunder 2007).
2.2.  Payments for watershed services: previous and current experiences  
in SE Asia
Whether or not watershed services make good PES markets is a subject often 
debated. In a 2006 report prepared for the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA), Robinson and Venema (2006) claimed that hydrological 
watershed services are ‘ideally’ suited to PES markets because there are direct 
and obvious users of water in a watershed, meaning that prospective buyers 
can be easily identified and targeted. This is the case when there is a clear 
delineation between the beneficiaries (often downstream domestic water users) 
and the providers (upstream farmers who have a direct impact on land-use) of 
the ES. Other authors argue that where the water resource is owned by many 
poor smallholders, or where there are many non-point sources of degradation/
contamination, difficulties in setting up the market and monitoring individuals’ 
behaviour result in high transaction costs and reduced cost-effectiveness (Jack et al. 
2008). Accordingly, in their evaluation of Vietnam’s potential for PES, Wunder et 
al. (2005) concluded that PES is unsuitable to watersheds where potential buyers 
are predominantly poor or lack basic knowledge of the linkages between land-use 
and watershed services. Thus, in the uplands of mainland SE Asia, where many 
potential ES providers are poor smallholder farmers, it is necessary to determine 
whether payment for watershed services can be effectively implemented. 
Countries of mainland SE Asia have engaged in PES at a much slower pace 
than in Central American countries at a similar level of economic development, 
with many proposed schemes, but few mature projects (Landell Mills and Porras 
2002; Huang and Upadhyaya 2007). In SE Asia, the majority of PES markets are 
located in the Philippines and in Indonesia – where the Rewarding the Upland 
Poor for Environmental Services (RUPES) programme currently oversees a 
number of PES markets which vary in operation and focus. In their review of 
PES in Asia, Huang and Upadhyaya (2007) argue that successful take-off of PES 
in Asia will depend upon five context-specific factors: (i) diverse governance 
structures and regulatory frameworks; (ii) risk of high transaction costs from high 
population density and low land holdings per capita; (iii) weak property rights for 
forest and agricultural land; (iv) insufficient hydrological data and understanding 
of watershed services; and (v) low awareness of PES. There is a significant 
need for further research that explains the effects of these factors on PES uptake 
for watershed services in upland communities where both upland and lowland 
communities are relatively poor and in some cases overlap.
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2.3. Choice of the study sites
Two sites with contrasting socioeconomic contexts have been selected, in Thailand 
and Lao PDR, respectively, to allow for general insights about PES schemes 
in mainland SE Asia, and to discuss the variability of PES feasibility in upper 
watersheds of mainland SE Asia. At the Thai site, relatively wealthy and well-
coordinated lowland paddy farmers are progressively deforesting the midlands 
to grow maize for the local animal feed industry. By comparison, the swidden-
fallow landuse in the sparsely populated highlands has a relatively limited impact 
on the environment. Although this pattern is not general to northern Thailand, the 
selected site remains representative of land degradation processes that prevail in 
this region, such as widespread forest encroachment for cash crop production (Lu 
et al. 2008). At the Lao site, the community is composed of poor farmers who 
grow mainly subsistence food crops and timber on steep slopes, gardeners who 
sell part of their production at the nearby Luang Prabang market, fish breeders, 
small traders and government employees. Some particularities, such as ethnicity 
dominated by Lao Lum, Khmu and Hmong, proximity to a major road and an 
average-sized urban centre, combine to make some characteristics of the Lao site 
relatively atypical compared to Lao PDR as a whole. Yet, the livelihoods of its 
residents as well as their ethnic diversity (a result of the government’s relocation 
policy) are clearly characteristic of most of Lao PDR’s upland populations 
(Lestrelin and Giordano 2007).
2.3.1. The Mae Thang watershed, Thailand
The Mae Thang watershed covers a 130 km2 area located in Phrae province of 
northern Thailand, about 550 km north from Bangkok. Phrae province includes 
eight districts and numerous sub-district administrative bodies known as Tambon 
Administrative Organisations (TAOs). The non-municipal area of the surveyed 
district incorporates 74 villages, which are divided among nine TAOs. The population 
of these villages totals 40,851 or 10.5% of the total non-municipal population 
of the greater Phrae province. The district has the lowest provincial population 
density at 32 inhabitants km–2 compared to an average 72 inhabitants km–2, due 
to the lack of inhabitants in the midlands (Phrae Province Statistical Office 2005). 
The catchment includes a 36 million m3 reservoir, operated since 1995 under 
the authority of the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) to irrigate 620 ha of paddy 
fields located in the plain immediately downstream from the dam. The reservoir 
hosts nine floating restaurants and 45 fish farms. The upper watershed is composed 
of mountainous highlands (>600 m) inhabited by Hmong and Mlabri populations 
who rely on subsistence agriculture for their livelihoods. In the few villages with 
road access, cabbage is grown to supply the local market. Between the highlands 
and lowlands lie uninhabited hills, which we will subsequently refer to as midlands. 
Lowland farmers began cultivating the midlands approximately 35 years ago when 
the opening of logging roads provided easy access to this area. Today, maize fields 
(Figure 1) permanently cover a large part of the midlands. The area converted to 
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annual cropping currently expands at a yearly rate of 3.35%, a twofold increase 
compared to 2000, when maize was first introduced in the watershed.
2.3.2. The Houay Xon watershed, Lao PDR
The Houay Xon watershed is located in the Luang Prabang province in northern 
Laos, south of the UNESCO World Heritage listed city of Luang Prabang. The 
studied watershed (Figure 2) covers 22 km2 and includes seven villages located 
along the Houay Xon stream. The stream runs for approximately 15 km and has 
three main tributaries. Average annual rainfall is 1403 mm (average over the last 
30 years). Elevations in this catchment range from 280 to 1336 m.a.s.l. (Phu Phung 
moutain range) with an average slope gradient of about 31%. The study area 
encompasses a population of 6251 inhabitants mostly of the Lao Lum, Khmu and 
Hmong ethnic groups. Most farming activities are located upstream, in the Houay 
Pano and Houay Thong headwater catchment, which were both surveyed for this 
study. Downstream village populations are dominated by government employees, 
and agricultural activities are limited to small scale vegetable gardening and fish 
breeding. Income levels in Houay Xon, although diverse, are typically very low 
(Figure 3). The majority of the population earns just enough money to satisfy their 
basic needs with an average 95% of income spent on food. 15% of the 67 studied 
households do not have access to electricity.
Figure 1: Number of years of cultivation since 1995 in the Mae Thang watershed, Thailand.
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2.4. Data collection procedure
Our data collection procedure was designed following the guidelines of the FAO 
electronic forum on payment schemes for environmental services in watersheds 
(FAO and REDLACH 2004). It included: i) surveys of local populations’ perception 
of environmental issues such as land degradation and/or changes in water quality, 
ii) critical analysis and compilation of pre-existing biophysical, socio-economic 
and geographical information and iii) field measurements acquired by the MSEC 
programme, an interdisciplinary research programme focused on on- and off-site 
impacts of soil erosion and active in six SE Asia partner countries (http://msec.
iwmi.org/).
To estimate the supply and demand for watershed services at both study sites 
we surveyed various target groups that included key stakeholders, such as farmers, 
villagers and traders, as well as provincial and government departments. For this 
Figure 2: The Huay Xong watershed, Lao PDR.
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purpose, we conducted semi-structured interviews with questions formulated to 
elicit both general and specific information, with both closed- and open-ended 
questions for basic livelihood data and enquiries regarding environmental 
services, respectively. While questionnaires differed according to the target group, 
all integrated three main sections: i) background information on livelihoods, ii) 
economic aspects, iii) perceptions and knowledge of environmental issues in the 
study area, and perceptions of the concept and feasibility of PES scheme.
In Thailand, our survey focused on activities and environmental concerns of 
lowlanders only. Highlands represent a small proportion of the watershed only 
(Figure 1) and deforested patches are relatively small as well, typically <5 hectares. 
Overall, highlanders have limited negative offsite impact on the environment at 
the watershed level. By comparison, the largest deforested area in the midlands 
extends over more than 20 km2, and lowlanders have started clearing the midlands 
for more than three decades for cash crop production. A sample of 50 interviewees 
were surveyed, including downstream villagers, most of whom were involved in 
cash crop production in the midlands, head of villages, traders, and representatives 
from NGOs and municipal, regional and national departments. In Laos, our survey 
relied on a sample of 67 households encompassing five categories of water users: 
farmers from upland and downstream areas, gardeners, traders and downstream 
villagers who only use water for domestic purposes.
Figure 3: Average annual income per household in the sampled villages in Laos.
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2.5. ES valuation
The cost of ES provision through various land management practices was assessed 
using simple calculations. The total costs linked to the adoption of the new practice 
were subtracted from the benefits derived from the new practice. Three types of 
costs were identified: (i) set-up costs including any initial investments e.g. to buy 
seeds, equipment and access training; (ii) initial opportunity costs associated with 
change in land use (e.g. loss of profits as new crops mature); and (iii) production 
costs associated with managing the new practice (more labour intensive, new 
taxes etc).
3. Results
3.1. Thailand
3.1.1. The ES: controlled soil erosion and sediment transport
Although most interviewees reported that water quality is steadily declining in 
the Mae Thang due to upstream agriculture-related chemical pollution, as well as 
contamination from fish farms, river water is not used for downstream domestic 
purposes. Therefore, there is little motivation amongst lowlanders to pay for 
cleaner water. Based on interviews of 50 households, the average household 
expenditure for bottled water is 30 Thai baht (~1 USD) per week. As almost all 
surveyed households included a farmer involved in the chemical pollution of the 
river, it is even more unlikely that this figure can be translated into willingness to 
pay (WTP) for foregoing the opportunity costs of discontinuing upstream use of 
fertilisers and other chemical inputs. 
Over 90% of surveyed midland farmers believe that soil erosion affects their 
land production negatively (Figure 4). Furthermore, 67% claim that runoff and 
Figure 4: Responses in Ban Pong village to the question “Are these environmental issues of 
concern for you?”.
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erosion are leaching the soil of valuable nutrients, with a negative impact on 
productivity, while 33% stated an increase in expenditure on fertilisers in recent 
years. Most interestingly, 75% of farmers have noticed visible changes in gully 
size on their land, reporting a widening of “several centimetres” following each 
major rainfall. However, these farmers continue to dismiss most of the mitigation 
methods offered to them. At the time of the survey, 75% declared that a cultivation 
ban on the steepest slopes was unacceptable to them, even with compensation, 
while 50% said they would not consider reforestation (e.g. with tamarind) as an 
option. In contrast, 82% of the interviewees regarded gully correction favourably, 
provided cost of building materials and labour is not charged to them. Discussions 
with TAO officers confirmed this interest in and demand for erosion control 
through gully correction. However, discussions also revealed that farmers already 
have the opportunity to build small check dams, through aid from the nationwide 
“check-dam Royal project”, but prefer using this aid to build temporary ponds in 
their villages in order to secure water supply during the dry season.
Based on survey findings, control of erosion and sediment transport within 
the catchment via the building of a network of check dams for gully correction, 
appears to be a possible watershed service (WS) that Mae Thang farmers might 
sell within the framework of a PES scheme. We also found, however, that 1) the 
potential WS sellers are also those primarily interested in benefiting from the 
service provision and, 2) it is not possible to distinguish between upstream WS 
providers and downstream buyers in the Mae Thang watershed. These specificities 
foreclose the possibility of setting up a simple PES scheme as defined under 
section 2.
3.1.2. Factors favourable to PES implementation
The site displayed two key features common to successful PES schemes in SE 
Asia. Firstly there is a significant level of pre-existing organisation and effective 
coordination among farmers. In 2007 water user groups were established in the 
lowlands in response to chronic water shortages blamed on low rainfall and poor 
water management. Water-use management groups now regulate dry season 
irrigation and coordinate water allocation to farmers in anticipation of future water 
shortages due to increasing demand and climate change. Many mid and lowland 
farmers are also grouped in agricultural co-operatives or sahagon that coordinate 
their access to capital and sale of produce. At the request of village heads these 
farmers have previously altered their practices from mechanical to manual sowing 
with no compensation for additional labour incurred, in order to minimise erosion 
in valley heads which drain directly into the Mae Thang reservoir. This precedent 
suggests the community is responsive to ES conservation. Secondly, regardless of 
the actual nature of their land rights, all land managers behave as legal owners and 
land transactions are commonplace within the community. This strong sense of 
ownership should act as a positive condition for management of land-use within 
a legal framework.
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3.1.3. Obstacles to PES implementation
A majority of interviewees expressed scepticism towards PES because they 
believe that services ‘from nature’ should be free. They also had bad experiences 
with contracts in the past (in particular with multinational agribusiness firms like 
Monsanto®), and they regarded the possibility of altering farming practices with 
disbelief (although some had already implemented such changes, as seen in the 
previous paragraph). Another important fact to take into account when considering 
putative PES schemes in the Mae Thang watershed is that midland maize fields are 
cultivated for cash, whereas lowland paddy fields are cultivated for subsistence. 
Consequently, there is very little motivation from other stakeholders to provide 
any sort of support, especially financial support, to midland farmers. 
Stakeholders have a limited understanding of soil erosion and means to 
combat it, a key obstacle to PES identified by Wunder (2005). One third of the 
interviewed farmers described an increased occurrence of rocks at the surface 
of their land but did not associate it with topsoil loss. Instead, they referred to 
this process as “rocks coming out of the soil”. Farmers also tend to disregard 
authorities and their efforts to control erosion and conserve land. In the site, the 
foothills are owned by the government of Thailand and placed under the authority 
of the National Park, Wildlife and Plant Conservation Department (DNP). Even 
where usufruct rights have been issued to some individuals they are accompanied 
by strict land-use restrictions such as prohibitions on clearing, and on cultivating 
steep slopes. Nevertheless, due to insufficient law enforcement, farmers now 
cultivate the entire foothills, including steep slopes and some valley heads directly 
connected to the reservoir. The authorities, especially DNP officers, are reluctant 
to consider payments to upland farmers in exchange for ES provision, as they 
pointedly observe that farmers cultivate the foothills illegally and have previously 
cleared tamarind trees planted by a conservation project.
3.1.4. Institutional capacity
The institutions and planning process that influence PES arrangements were 
studied by combining responses from upstream and downstream water users 
with those of local authorities. TAO officers were interviewed to assess the 
potential involvement of local administration in a PES scheme. TAO budgetary 
rules prevent the transfer of money outside of the tambon, thereby preventing 
joint projects involving more than one tambon across a given watershed. This 
is particularly problematic for PES where payments from downstream service 
beneficiaries must be made to upstream service providers located across such 
administrative boundaries. 
The Royal Irrigation Department (RID) was identified as another potential 
buyer of the controlled erosion and sediment transport service. An echo-sonar 
sounding carried out in 2005 showed that the reservoir had been filled with 
3.5 106 m3 (almost 10% of its capacity) of sediments during a period of ten years. As 
with soil erosion, sedimentation varies significantly depending on rainfall intensity. 
In 2004, for example, the same amount of sediment as that deposited over the eight 
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preceding years reached the reservoir after one single extreme storm (rainfall of 
218 mm over 6 hours). RID estimates the dredging cost at THB 15 m–3 (USD 
0.5 m–3). On this basis, the cost of sedimentation would represent THB 5.4 million 
per year (USD 160,000). However, this amount does not represent a WTP from 
RID because the objective of dredging is to prevent siltation of the intake pipe, 
which is usually achieved by dredging a tiny fraction of the accumulated sediments. 
Especially, the coarser fraction of the sediments (≈60% of total sedimentation) 
settle at the mouths of rivers and gullies often located kilometres upstream from 
the dam. Moreover, dredging is requested only after the level of sediment has 
reached the intake pipe. In the Mae Thang reservoir, dredging of the reservoir is 
not anticipated before a few decades despite the high siltation rate. Interviews of 
RID officers highlighted that agriculture is not the only cause of dam siltation. A 
nearby dam, for example, was severely damaged by massive landslides during 
an extreme storm in 2004, despite the fact that the surrounding watershed was 
entirely forested. This is further confirmed by measurements made in the Mae 
Thang watershed during the same event, indicating that channel erosion prevails 
during extreme storms (Valentin et al. 2008), thus limiting the efficiency of any 
soil conservation practice with regard to control of reservoir siltation. Finally, 
RID authority is limited to the dam and the irrigated area, whereas the watershed 
is under the authority of DNP.
3.2. Lao PDR
3.2.1. The ES: a guaranteed water flow of defined quality
Our surveys revealed a clear downstream demand for improved water quality 
and more constant stream water flow in the Houay Xon catchment (Mousquès 
et al. 2007). In addition to topsoil loss, soil erosion is responsible for changes in 
water quality and increased instability of surrounding landscapes. In particular, 
frequent land clearing and burning yields large amounts of vegetable material 
that can often be seen obstructing the stream. Human pressure such as farming 
activities and construction works cause landslides (Lebreton 2007), which lead 
to dramatic soil loss and increased the turbidity of the Houay Xon (Ribolzi 
et al. 2008). Erosion from upland maize fields has now reached 5.9 t ha–1 year–1 of 
sediments, a marked increase from the 1990s where erosion was stable at 0.9 t ha–1 
year–1 (Valentin et al. 2008). Furthermore, the yearly sediment load exported from 
this catchment is increasingly affecting downstream water quality. The MSEC 
programme established that alternative farming practices and careful management 
of sensitive areas (e.g. riparian areas; Vigiak et al. 2007) opens new avenues for 
the improvement of downstream water quality by reducing sediment delivery (van 
Breusegem 2005; Valentin et al. 2006; van der Helm 2007). The effectiveness and 
cost of each of these measures have been evaluated (Table 1), either via field trials 
or modelling. Based on these assessments, conservation or introduction of grass 
along river banks is an effective means ES that can control sediment delivery to 
streams and meet downstream demand for improved water quality with virtually 
zero associated costs apart from labour. All the Houay Pano farmers interviewed 
Potential and limitations of PES 29
confirmed they were aware of soil erosion problems and, in principle, are willing 
to implement soil conservation practices in exchange for some compensation.
3.2.2. Factors favourable to PES implementation
Survey findings indicate 3.7% of villagers identify themselves as gardeners or 
small-scale producers of fruits and vegetables sold directly to consumers and 
restaurants in Luang Prabang. They comprise the only users of stream water in 
downstream villages (Figure 5). The use of polluted water for garden irrigation is 
undoubtedly a cause of concern for consumers, but its actual impact compared to 
those associated with excessive use of fertilisers and herbicides was not assessed 
by this study. Land use in downstream villages is undergoing change; 2003 data 
from the DAFEO (Lestrelin et al. 2005) shows a clear decrease in the percentage 
of revenue derived from farming or market gardens between 1990 and 2003 in 
Ban Lak Sip and Ban Donkang (Figure 6) and although market gardeners derive 
46% of their income from the sale of vegetables, this still remains a marginally 
profitable activity. This change was also observed in villages further downstream 
from Ban Donkang (Rural Development Committee 1999). The main economic 
activity of these villages is now commerce, and half of the producers interviewed 
declared that they wanted to decrease their area under cropping. Downstream 
villagers who are fish farmers are also potential ES buyers as they complain 
about water quality. But they themselves cause serious water pollution because 
of the lack of infrastructure to collect wastes or wastewater from their fish ponds. 
The survey identified that, overall, WTP within the sampled population was 
approximately USD 0.3 month–1 household–1, which if used to compensate upland 
farmers for implementing new land management practices (Table 1), would be 
sufficient to abate some of the negative impacts of soil erosion on water quality. 
However, in addition to soil erosion control upstream, improving water quality 
in the stream will require collection of domestic waste and grey water, as well 
as reduction of water seepage from latrines, but the current WTP is too low to 
support these interventions.
Table 1: Selection of possible environmental management practices and estimated costs in the 
Laos site.
Proposed solution Cost in USD/inhabitant/month
Improved fallow  0.22
Contour planting  0.20
Conservation agriculture (i.e. zero tillage, crop rotations  
and permanent soil cover)
 0.16
Grass on river banks <0.016
Tree corridors/plantations  0.15
Garbage collection system  0.23
Grey water collection system  0.46
Toilet construction 20#
Note: 1 USD=8750 LAK; # was a one-off payment.
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Figure 5: Spatial relationship between the different water users along the Houay Xon.
Figure 6: Evolution of the share of households’ income generated by agriculture in two study 
villages from 1993 to 2003.
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3.2.3. Obstacles to the implementation of PES
The alternative land-use practices priced in Table 1 may be hard to implement due 
to a range of reasons, among which the most conspicuous are inflexible land use and 
land allocation policies, and the strong overlap between ES users and providers.
In all the villages downstream of Ban Kouathineug the official land-use plan 
is to increase the area under intensive annual cropping. This intensification risks 
increasing soil erosion and is at odds with land-use changes suggested by the MSEC 
programme. In addition, the current land allocation system makes it difficult, if 
not impossible, for farmers to alter land-use (NGPES, cited in NAFRI et al. 2005). 
Whereas it is a basic principle of PES that there is enough flexibility to alter land-
use so as to ensure delivery of ES, district land was strictly allocated on a village 
basis under the National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy (NGPES). 
There also appears to be confusion amongst villagers about the land allocation 
process, which further complicates the process of negotiating changes to land-
use allotments. According to village chiefs, different authorities or institutions 
conduct land allocation in different villages. In Ban Phoumok, the provincial 
government is responsible, whereas it is the UNESCO Heritage House at Ban 
Khoy. Such variability in authority can further increase transaction costs when 
setting up a PES market. This complexity obviously calls for reassessment, as 
recently acknowledged by the Lao government (Lestrelin and Giordano 2007). 
As in northern Thailand, environmental degradation is not only caused by 
agricultural activities in the Houay Xon catchment. Fish farmers also affect water 
quality by releasing chemical and organic waste into the stream. Even more 
importantly, our survey showed that the downstream community is playing a 
major role in the deterioration of the quality of water in the stream. 68% of the 
interviewees said increasing population density along the stream and household 
waste were the major causes of reduced water quality. Only seven of the 67 
surveyed households are currently using the existing garbage collection service, 
and 48% mentioned the need for an efficient garbage collection service. Estimated 
input of grey water (i.e. water used for washing clothes, dishes, personal care, 
etc.) varied from 50 to more than 2500 litres household–1 week–1, and 44% of 
surveyed households declared releasing from 1000 to 1500 litres of wastewater 
into the stream every week, which is in the range of observed values for developing 
countries in the wet tropics (Gleick 1996). Seepage from poorly built latrines 
as well as direct defecation into the river are also commonplace. Nevertheless, 
villagers are not aware of the existence of a groundwater table and its connection 
with the river system, so that the concept of contamination of groundwater 
through the infiltration of polluted water is not understood. Efforts will be needed 
to help communities recognize their responsibility for this pollution, change their 
behaviour and increase their WTP. Their currently low WTP results from a poor 
understanding of environmental processes and scepticism of the potential benefits 
they will derive from improved WS, especially since downstream villages are 
populated by a majority of employees, factory workers and shopkeepers, whose 
needs for stream water are rather limited.
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Potential private sector ES buyers include two downstream bottled water 
companies, namely the Nam Papa and the Luang Prabang Pre-Stress Concrete 
Plant (DLPCP) companies. However, as both these water companies have direct 
access to and control of headwaters that they exploit, there is, within the catchment, 
no other stakeholder they could possibly buy a watershed service from. Moreover, 
the Nam Papa company has a license to operate as the exclusive user of a 3000 
ha area located on the Phu Phung Mountain and aims to completely reforest it by 
banning annual cropping. The DLPCP also owns large tracts of land around the 
spring that is the source of its water. Proposing a PES scheme to companies that 
already have such a substantial influence on land use in the surrounding areas will 
more than likely fail.
The population relocation policy initiated in the 1970s (Lestrelin et al. 2006) 
resulted in the cohabitation of several ethnic groups within small communities, 
often inducing tensions, and fell short of establishing good communication 
among villages and between villages and local authorities. Such a low level of 
communication within groups in the watershed will bring substantial difficulties 
in the negotiation process of any PES scheme between them.
3.2.4. Institutional capacity
In response to the question “If there is not enough water in the stream or it 
becomes suddenly unusable, towards whom will you turn for help?” more 
than half of interviewees answered that there was no one to help them. Less 
than 20% said they would turn to district authorities, and about 16% would go 
to their village chief. Overall, interviews highlighted that the community does 
not consider local authorities responsible for their well-being, or for the state 
of the environment. This may relate to the historical lack of direct government 
support for development programmes, matters for which the government still 
largely relies on support from international development agencies. Given such a 
low level of the people’s expectation towards the government, it appears highly 
unlikely that district authorities would be in a position to manage a PES market 
which would be put in place in this type of area. Perhaps more realistically, the 
UNESCO Heritage House, which is a national Lao authority reporting directly to 
the Minister of Information and Culture from its base in Luang Prabang, could act 
as an administrative mediator for the PES scheme. Currently, the main missions 
of the Heritage House are to manage, conserve and enhance the natural, cultural 
and architectural heritage within the protected area encompassing the old historic 
city and adjacent banks of both the Mekong and Nam Khan rivers. The Heritage 
House has actively promoted gardening with organic fertilisers in several villages, 
including Ban Ma and Ban Khoy within our study area. The Heritage House is 
also involved in planning land-use and implementing building regulations. Other 
scientific organisations could also assist with implementing new land management 
practices. One of the missions of the Northern Agriculture and Forestry Research 
Centre (NAFReC) based in Luang Prabang, is to establish alternative cropping 
systems which protect soils. Public institutions concerned with water issues are 
Potential and limitations of PES 33
numerous in Laos and could also be of valuable assistance with implementation 
of a PES. Similarly, the National Centre for Environmental Health and Water 
supply, or Nam Saat, is a unit under the Ministry of Health that is in charge of 
the Water Supply System (WSS) and receives support from several national and 
international organisations. One WSS coordination unit in Luang Prabang, the 
Administrative Authority of urban planning, works with the Heritage House and 
already coordinates garbage collection in 36 villages. Thus, this unit might prove 
a key partner for efforts to implement a PES in the study area.
4. Discussion
4.1. PES and poverty
Pagiola et al. (2007) showed that in Colombia poor households could engage in 
PES markets almost as easily as more wealthy stakeholders. The most noticeable 
difference was higher transaction costs when the ES was supplied by poor 
households because a larger number of suppliers had to be contracted to cover a 
given area. Similarly, our study suggests that poverty does not limit engagement 
in PES programmes. At the Thai site, the spontaneous emergence of water users 
group following the 2007 water shortages, as well as the discontinuation of 
mechanical sowing to reduce soil erosion, reflect attitudes which show potential for 
ES conservation and trade by local stakeholders. At the Lao site, although farmers 
and villagers are poor, they showed some awareness of environmental problems 
which translated into modest levels of WTP for improved water quality.
4.2. Downstream ES buyers vs upstream ES suppliers
The prevailing conceptual framework for PES is restricted to a dichotomous view 
that strictly separates ES suppliers from ES buyers. Classically, ES provision by 
a well identified and delimited community (usually based upstream in the case 
of WS) is enhanced as a result of some form of incentive provided by a separate 
community (based downstream in the case of WS). It is usually more advantageous 
for the ES ‘buyer’ to compensate the costs of ES provision rather than reactively 
manage the consequences of ES degradation. A fundamental finding of this study 
is that this simple concept can be difficult to apply in specific local contexts. At 
the Thai site, upstream and downstream stakeholders were found to be part of the 
same community. In addition, income distribution was atypical with poorer people 
taking on the role of ES buyers. At the Lao site, various communities distributed 
along the stream all contribute to water pollution. Moreover, the administrative 
structures that should act as intermediaries between upstream and downstream 
communities were found to be either lacking or not readily suitable.
4.3. Socio-economic barriers
At the Thai site, lowland paddy fields are cultivated for subsistence, while maize is 
grown for cash in the midlands. Farmers who cultivate land in the hills are to some 
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extent wealthier than those who do not, or at least this is how they are regarded by 
those not involved in midland farming. As a consequence, rice growers from the 
plain have no WTP to pay for combating erosion in the fields of midland maize 
growers. At the Lao site, reduced or inexistent communication among villages 
jeopardizes any possible transaction between them. Moreover, both upstream 
and downstream users negatively affect water quality. As a consequence, a PES 
programme which would only target upstream farmers as ES suppliers would 
only address part of the problem and would likely exacerbate tensions among 
communities across the catchment.
4.4. Private property and institutional frameworks
In the literature, several authors suggest that clear land ownership is a prerequisite 
to commitment to conservation practices. Bracer et al. (2007) describe property 
rights as the ‘foundation for legal (market) transactions’. Kerr and Jindal (2007) 
also set land rights at the highest rank of requirements for PES scheme viability. 
This assertion, however, is also debated. In Kulekhani, Nepal, research showed 
that in the absence of land tenure, user rights were sufficient to establish a 
working PES scheme (Huang and Upadhyaya 2007). Extending property rights to 
environmental commodities such as water is viewed as another way of encouraging 
stakeholders to increase their WTP (Vincent et al. 1995) and show interest in 
a PES market. However, establishing environmental markets of this sort in SE 
Asia would ‘require an institutional revolution’ (Vincent et al. 1995). Our results 
support an intermediary position. At the Thai site, perceived land rights appear 
to prevail over legal entitlements. As long as owners’ rights are respected, and 
there are efficient and trusted local procedures to solve conflicts related to land 
rights, the need for titles issued by the government did not appear to be an issue. 
In Lao PDR, however, the rather strict control of land use and allocation by the 
government remains a constraint for implementation of a PES scheme based on 
land use change.
4.5. Who should really be paying for the ES?
Advocates of PES usually describe it as a system of economic incentives for ES 
provision, wherein “communities that are in a position to provide an ES should 
receive compensation and it is those who benefit from these services that should 
pay …” (Mayrand and Paquin 2004, p. 5). Accordingly, large private or public 
agencies located downstream are often targeted as potential buyers of watershed 
services. Because Lao PDR is the country where most of the region’s hydropower 
development will occur in the future, hydropower operators will likely play an 
important role in PES schemes that may be established in this country.
A frequently cited inventory of PES markets around the world by the same 
authors, often applies the term ‘compensation’ to describe the process of internalising 
positive externalities. In reality, however, discussions limited to economic incentive 
concepts can distort the nature of ES provision by upland farmers. Examples 
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from Thailand and Lao PDR reveal an existing willingness of communities to 
provide ES without compensation when they recognise that long-term benefits will 
accrue to upstream as well as downstream stakeholders. In these cases, payment 
may be understood as a means for facilitating technology transfer, education and 
institutional organization to support ES provision, rather than as compensation in 
a narrow sense. Indeed, the term ‘compensation’ tends to suggest that sellers are 
providing a service from which they themselves do not benefit, and reinforces the 
often unrealistic binary distinction of flows between uplands and lowlands. Finally, 
as shown by the Lao case, not all environmental issues are eligible for a PES 
market and would be better served by other programmes and fiscal tools.
5. Conclusions
Our study aimed to assess the potential and limitations of PES as a means to 
manage watershed services under conditions in mainland Southeast Asia. Based 
on two case studies, in Lao PDR and Thailand, we can conclude that neither 
situation offered an immediate opportunity for launching a PES market for 
watershed services. Major issues and obstacles found at case study sites included 
the following:
•	 The classic watershed-oriented downstream vs upstream scheme did not 
apply. In Lao PDR, the main concern was water pollution, but downstream 
villagers were causing as much pollution as upstream stakeholders. In 
Thailand, downstream and upstream stakeholders turned out to belong to the 
same community. 
•	 WTP was consistently low, and largely insufficient to address environment 
service issues raised in the study. External sources of funding will likely be 
needed to establish PES schemes at the local scale. Alternatively, PES might 
address the issues at larger scales than explored in this study (22–130 km2).
•	 When upstream stakeholders are (or are perceived as) wealthier than 
downstream stakeholders, WTP for ES provided by upstream stakeholders 
was very low. In this case, law enforcement, new regulations, education and/
or a PES market at a larger scale might be better alternatives.
•	 Restricted and inflexible land rights inherently contradict the PES concept 
which requires that land use can be altered at the will of service providers. 
However, in areas where the enforcement of land use regulations is weak, 
perceived land rights prevail, regardless of the formal rights that support the 
perception. Rather unexpectedly, this may prove an important factor to the 
success of PES.
•	 Effective social organisation, including trust in local authorities, farmers’ 
organisations (e.g. co-operatives), etc., is a strong prerequisite for launching 
a PES market. Conversely, rigid administrative bodies with inadequate 
mandates, will or funding to address watershed issues may make it difficult to 
implement a PES market at the local level.
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